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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
SYLVIA HILL and ANN RASMUSSON,
Co-Ex.ecutors of the Estate of
Lila Shand Anderson, deceased,
and SYLVIA HILL and ANN RASMUSSON
Individually,
'
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
SAFECO INSURANCE COMP ANY,
Defendant.
CAROLYN A. JENSEN, Administratrix
of the Estate of A. Paul Anderson,
also known as Archie Paul Anderson,
deceased,
Intervenor and Respondent.

Case
No.

11268

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to determine .entitlement, as between
two .estates, to the proceeds of fire insurance issued to, in
the name of, and the pr.emiums on which were paid by Respondent's Intestate. The insurer (Safeco Insurance Company) is not involved in the appeal.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Upon Findings of Fact that the husband (Respondent's
Intestate) had paid all pr.emiums upon a policy which had
been issued to him and exclusively in his name; that the
husband had an insurable interest in the improvements to
the real property and was the owner of separate personal
property insured thereby, the Trial Court ruled that the
husband's estate was entitled to the insurance proceeds.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
R.espondent asks this Court to affirm the judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The competing interests are the estates of a husband
and wife simultaneously killed when their residence burned
at Salina, Utah. Both had children by former marriages
and separate heirs.
The "Home Owners Policy" (Exhibit 3) issued by Safeco Insurance Company 1 was a renewal of the orginal and
successor policies, all of which were issued to and in the
name exclusively of A. Paul Anderson (R. 69 and Exhibit

3).

A. Paul Anderson, the Respondent's Intestate, will be
referred to as "Paul". Appellants' Intestate, Lila Shand
Anderson, will be referred to as "Lila".
The first policy of insurance was issued to Paul when
he and his first wife, Adelia Anderson, mother of Paul's
heirs, purchased the home in 1957 (R. 69).
Paul paid all of the premiums required to maintain the
Home Owners Policy in effect which premiums were paid,
as agreed in the mortgage, out of a reserve credited from
a part of the monthly mortgage installments (R. 69 and
Exhibit 6). The Trial Court found that Paul paid all and
that Lila paid none of the premiums on the policy (R. 55,
Finding No. 9) There is no evidence to the contrary.
The policy (Exhibit 3) provided coverage of $17,000.00
upon the building and $6,800.00 for personal p r o p e rt Y
(R. 55).
The evidenoe is undisputed that the building, prior to
Paul's marriage to Lila, had a value of $17,000.00 (R. 107)
and that Paul had separate distinguishable personal property in the residence at the time of the loss having a value
exceeding $7,000.00 (R. 104). The Court made findings to
this effect (R. 55, Finding No. 13).
lWhich, having paid the proceeds of the policy into Co u rt and withdrawn, is not a party to this appeal.
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It appears customary with Paul that in each of his two
marriag,es title to the residence was held in the name of the
wifo. (R. 65, Exhibit 1; R. 71, Exhibit 8).

Adelia Anderson, Paul's first wife and the mother of
the heirs in his estate, took record title to the home when it
was purchased (Exhibit 8). Adelia died February 29, 1964
(R. 96). Prior to her death she had executed a deed to the
home running in favor of her three children but this was
never recorded (Exhibit 24. See also R. 108, 109).
There was a Warranty Deed from Paul to his second
wife, Lila, which they did record (Exhibit 1, See R. 65).
The insuranoe company and the mortgage company
continued to send notices to Adelia or "Ada Anderson" after
her death (R. 72, Exhibit 6). Paul continued to pay all the
mortgage payments (Exhibit 7) and took out each renewal
policy in his own name (Exhibit 1).
LHa was a lady of considerabJ,e personal i n h e r i t e d
worth (R. 104) spending a great deal of money in the home
(Tr. 87-92) and undoubtedly had substantial personal property in the residence at the time of the loss; nevertheless,
Paul's property was not over-insured prior to any improvements she might have made (R. 106, Findings 12 and 13,
R. 55).
Paul was r,esiding in ·the home as of the date of his
death (R. 81); he was paying taxes thereon (R. 69, Exhibit
G), lights (R. 79), water and sewer (R. 80), and furnishing
fuel (R. 81) to the home.
Telephone bills in substantial amounts wel'e paid by
Lila (R. 94).
Lila ldt a Last WiU and Testament which counsel for
her estate offered into evidence. (Exhibit 9 and R. 73).
This gav,e to Paul a life estate in the property with the
condition subsequent that should he remarry his life estate
Would be extinguished (Exhibit 9, Paragraph 6).
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Paul was not a party to Lila's will and there is no evidence whether he knew or did not know of its contents. The
eff.ect of Lila's will would have defeated Paul's children of
anY in: erest in the home previously owned by thei·r mother
and paid for by their parents. Had Lila left no will or had
she left at least as much as is provided by the Utah Laws
of intestate succession Paul's heirs would have inherited
some estate in the home (Section 74-4-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953).
After the loss the Executrices of the Last Will and
T.estament of Lila filed suit (R. 1-4) against the insuranoe
company defendant which answered alleging that an indispensable party, namely the personal representativ.e of
Paul's estate, was not before the Court (R. 6). Upon intervention of Paul's estate the insurance company paid the
proceeds of the policy into Court and withdrew (R. 10-13).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRTAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED
THAT THE HUSBAND'S ESTATE WAS ENTITLED TO THE PROCEEDS OF HIS OWN FIRE INSURANCE POLICY.
A. A POLICY OF FIRE INSURANCE TS A PERSON AL CONTRACT WHICH DOES NOT RUN
WITH THE LAND.
B. NETTHER THE P 0 L ICY NOR ITS FACE
VALUE CONSTITUTES "PROCEEDS OF THE
PROPERTY INSURED"
C. A STRANGER TO THE POLICY CANNOT INTERFERE WTTH THE TNSURED'S RIGHT TO
SETTLEMENT WITH HIS INSURER.
Appellants' expression of the issues in their Statement
of Points is considerably more argumentative than either
the brief or the cases they employ.
4

Their thesis - that destruction of substantial property
owned by the wife entitles her ,estate to participate in insurance owned by another indemnifying his own insurable
interests - seems to be based upon two misconceptions, one
of fact and one of law.
First, and as we will discuss hereinafter, the husband
owned, individually and separately, personal property valued
in excess of the personal property coverage (R. 104). Second, the husband had an insurable interest in the improvements to real property which the law will not seek to evaluate (See Couch on Insurance, 2d Edition, Sec. 24.2 p. 67).
A. A POLICY OF FIRE INSURANCE IS A PERSONAL CONTRACT WHICH DOES NOT RUN
WITH THE LAND.
It is universally recognized that a policy of fire insurance is personal property. Appleman on Insurance, Vol. 3A,
Page 206, S.ection 1861. It is a personal contract (Galante
vs. Hathaway Bakers, Inc., 176 NYS 2d 87) and runs to the
insured and not with the land. Richardson vs. Providence
Washington Insurance Co., 237 NYS 2d 893.
A fire insurance policy is a personal contract indemnifying the insured against loss resulting from the destruction of or damage to that property. (Russell vs. Williams,
374 P2d 827, 58 Cal 2d. 487 and the cases therein cited.)
B. NEITHER THE POLICY NOR ITS FACE VALUE

CONSTITUTES "PROCEEDS OF THE PROPERTY INSURED"
The sum paid is in no proper or just sense the "proceeds of the property." Spaulding vs. Miller, 103 Ky. 405,
45 SW 462, Russell vs. Williams, supra.

In Russell vs. Williams, supra, 374 P2d at Pag.e 829,
it is held:
It is a principle of standing that a policy of fire insurance does not insure the property covered thereby, but is a personal contract indemnifying t~e insur.ed against loss resulting from the destruction of
or damage to his interest in that property.
5

The facts in that case are remarkably similar to thos,e
found here:
There the wife, who survived the husband, was a joint
tenant with him in property upon which the husband had
procured a policy of fire insurance. The husband and wife
separated and the wife obtained a Nevada divorce in which
no reference was made to property rights of the parties.
The husband insured the premises which were destroyed
shortly before his death. The wife became the sole owner
of the premises (virtually the pl'.ecise facts here) 2 by reason
of the husband's death and brought suit to recover the insurance proceeds.
The Court observed that "the Plaintiff's claim is based
on the contention that the moneys paid under the policy
constituted proceeds of the prop,erty and retains the character of that property". This, the Court held, "is a f a 1s e
premise".
After supporting the observations above with numerous cases from many jurisdictions the California Supreme
Court ruled in logical sequence that:
(374 P2d at page 830) Unless the insured has an
obligation to insure, or equitable considerations are
present, the proceeds of a policy issued to and paid
for by the named insured on his separate insurable
interest ar.e not subjecct to the claim of others who
also have an interest in the property covered by the
policy.

* * *

There is no obligation upon the part of one co-tenant
to insure the other co-tenant against loss of the latter's inter,est in their jointly owned property.

* * *

As to this matter there is no distinction between the
2Since this action was tried in the District Court the Executrices of
Lila's estate have sold and conveyed the land and s a 1 v a g e of the
building.
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various types of co-tenancy. Analogously it has been
held that there is no duty upon a life tenant to insure for the benefit of the remaindermen.

* * *

Following the rules her.etofore stated, the right of
one co-tenant to recover the proceeds of a policy of
insurance issued to another co-tenant has been deni·ed (citing cas.es) . T h e s a m e ruling has been
applied as between a life tenant and a I'.emainderman.
The Russell case is clearly identical with the facts here.
Paul held and maintained a separate, insurable interest in
the property. He obtained and paid for out of his separate
funds all the premiums on the policy (R. 55) which was
issued in his name sol.ely (Exhibit 3). His wife's estate
through a conveyance (rather t h an by termination of a
joint tenancy as in the Russell case) emerged with title and
upon loss seeks to acquire the insuranoe proceeds.
C. A STRANGER TO THE POLICY CANNOT INTERFERE W I T H THE JNSURED'S RIGHT TO
SETTLEMENT WITH HIS INSURER.
The Russell case is clearly identical w i t h the facts
here. Paul held and maintained a separate, insurable interest in the property. He obtained and paid for out of his
separate funds all the premiums on the policy (R. 55) which
was issued in his name solely (Exhibit 3).
It is most significant that the California S u p r e m e
Court, although adopting much of the intermediate appellatee court's language, saw fit to add the following pronouncements:

(374 P2d at page 832) Mr. Mouser (Defendant Williams' intestate) by purchasing with his separate
funds fire insurance payable to himself alone evidenced an intent to protect only his own inteiiest in
the property and not that his co-tenant should shl:lre
in any proceeds of the insurance contract to which
she was not a party and for which she gave no consideration.
7

The terms of this policy were fixed before Lila had any
connection with or inter.est in the premises affected. (Exhibits 3, 6 and 7).
An insurer may not, in fact, pay a loss to any one other
than or except for the insured or his designee. Mercantile
Credit Corp vs. Downey, 238 NYS2d 630; Ketner Bros. vs.
Nichols, 324 P2d 1093.
POINT II
THE HUSBAND HAD THE ONLY INSURABLE
INTEREST IN THE INSURED PERSONALTY;
HAD AN INSURABLE INTEREST IN THE INSURED IMPROVEMENTS TO R E A LT Y AND
WAS UNDER NO DUTY TO INSURE FOR THE
BENEFIT OF HIS SECOND WIFE'S ESTATE.
A. THE HUSBAND OWNED, SINGLY AND SEPARATELY, PERSONAL PR 0 PERT Y EXCEEDING IN VALUE THE PERS 0 N AL
PROPERTY COVERAGE.
B. THE HUSBAND HELD AN INSURABLE INTEREST IN THE INSURED IMPROVEMENTS
TO REALTY AND A STRANGER TO THE
POLICY HAS NO STANDING TO QUESTION
THE VALUE OF HIS INTEREST.
C. THERE JS NO DUTY ON A PERSON IN POSSESSION TO INSURE THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS IN THE PROPERTY.
A. THE HUSBAND OWNED, SINGLY AND SEP ARATEL Y, PERSONAL PROPERTY EXCEEDING
IN VALUE THE PERSONAL PROPERTY COVERAGE.
The insurance policy afforded coverage of $6,800.00 for
"unscheduled personal property" (Exhibit 3). Paul had in
excess of $7,000.00 worth of personal property destroyed
in the fire (R. 104) and this evidence was uncontradicted
(R. 55 Findings No. 13) .
Pa u 1 had an "insurable interest" however, in Lila'~
property, real and personal (Annotati<>n 27 ALR2d 1059, see
8

editorial comment at page 1060). For purposes of personal
property, howev.er, he need assert none because of his separate, insured property rights.

B. THE HUSBAND HELD AN INSURABLE INTEREST IN THE INSURED IMPROVEMENTS TO
REALTY AND A STRANGER TO THE POLICY
HAS NO STANDING TO QUESTION THE
VALUE OF HIS INTEREST.
The ALR Annotation (Volume 27 2d at page 1060) observes:
Summarizing the decisions, without at this point
going into detail, it appears that where a spouse has
some pecuniary or beneficial interest in the other
spouse's property, or would suffer some disadvantage from its loss, he or she has been held to have
an insurable interest therein.
Thes.e decisions apply equally to real property as well
as personal property (See Page 1064 of the Annotation).
It is obvious that in this case Paul stood to sustain
some disadvantage from the loss of the property and that
he also had both a pecuniary and a beneficial inter.est in the
"real property of his spouse" as those terms are employed
in the ALR Annotation. It is to be noted that those conditions are not in th€ conjunctiv,e but are in the disjunctive,
the rule being that the spouse in order to have an insurable
interest in the property of his wife or her husband, need
only hav.e a :pecuniary interest or a beneficial inter.est,~
would suffer "some disadvantagefrom its loss".
In practice, insurance companies request information
from named insureds, to assist in a determination of whether or not they had an insurable interest in the property,
relating to who paid the taxes and mortgage payments
upon the property, who paid the lights, gas, fuel, water, and
other utilities, and whether that person maintained any
residence separate and distinct from the premises destroyed
by fire.
9

This practice is obviously a consequence of the decisions collected in 27 ALR2d and reflected in the highly important Utah decision of National Farmers Union vs.
Thompson, 4 U2d 7, 286 P2d 249, which, in interpeting
Utah Laws, states this:
But if he has an inter.est of any character in the
property so that he will or may derive some pecuniary benefit from the continued existence of the
property or suffer pecuniary loss from its destruction by fire, he may properly be said to meet the
statutory requirement of having a "substantial
economic interest". If this test is met, that suffices,
and the nature of his interest or the status of his
title or possession is immaterial.

In that case the plaintiff had actually sold the property
to another but retained the use of the building to store his
machinery.
How can it be said tl:at Paul Anderson, who had such
an .equitable interest in the building as to be paying mortgage payments, taxes, utilities, and furnishing the fuel
costs thereto, did not have an insurable interest. He had
an unqualified right of possession and, by Plaintiffs' own
evidence, would hav.e had the right to the same for an indeterminate and indefinite period of time following the
death of Plaintiffs' intestate.
Of all the cases we have .examined, the o n l y one in
which a husband was held not to hav.e an insurable interest
in his wife's property involved theft of a diamond ring
(Price vs. United Pacific Casualty Ins. Co., 153 Ore. 259, 56
P2d 116). It i·s elemental to observe that the husband would
not likely sustain any disadvantage or any pecuniary loss as
a result of this theft. The Court in that cas.e, however, was
careful to point out that an insurable interest of the husband in his wife's personal property must be recognized in
items such as "household furniture, where the two w,ere in
possession and enjoyment of the personalty, since he there-
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by derived an advantage from the property and would sustain a loss if it was destroyed or stolen"; but since the husband did not contend that he had any beneficial interest in
the ring and that it appeared that it was not in his possession and that its destruction or theft would not terminate
any advantage which he had enjoyed previously, he had no
insurable inter.est ther.ein.
Here, as in many instances, the expression of one ,exception to the rule of law clearly delineates the field of facts
and circumstances which are expressly covered by the general rule. In Grogan vs. Henderson, 313 SW2d 316, it was
held that where fire policies on house and furniture belonging to decedent and her husband were personal between the
husband and insurers, the pr o c e e d s of the policy were
payable .exclusively to the husband, notwithstanding the
fact that such property might have been community property and notwithstanding the fact that the heirs of the decedent might have had an insurable interest in such property.
In Newsome vs. St. Paul Mercury Fire Insurance Co.,
:)31 SW2d 497, was held:
The proceeds of a fire policy taken out by a joint
owner on only his interest inure to his benefit alone
and where by the terms of the policy the insurer is
not to be liable beyond the interest of the insured in
the property, a stranger to the contract cannot collect thereon simply because he was the owner of an
undivided inter.est in the property.
In the Washington Supr.eme C o u r t case of Ketner
Bros., Inc., vs. Nichols, cited hereinabove, it is held:

It is elementary that a fire insurance policy is a
pur,ely personal contract, and that payment by the
insurer to the insured named in the policy is compulsory * * * Considering this fact, the defendants
had no authority to interfere with the payment of
the proceeds to the insur,ed much less a duty to do
so.
11

C. THERE IS NO DUTY ON A PERSON IN POSSESSION TO INSURE THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS IN
THE PROPERTY.
Probably one of the most definitive cases on this point
is the Virginia Supreme Court decision of Lynch vs. Johnson, 196 Va. 516, 84 SE2d 419, a 1954 case. In this decision
the Court stated:
Hence, it may be said generally, if any person insures his own interest in property in his own right
and at his own expens,e, then he is entitled to the insurance proceeds and the owner of any other interest in that property has no claim to such proceeds;
and if the insurance so procured exceeds the value of
the insurable interest, then the excess is of no concern to any other person who also has an inter,est
in the property but is a question exclusively between
the insured and the insurer.
The Lynch case r.ef.ers to the Massachusetts decision of
Harrison vs. Pepper, 166 Mass. 288, 44 NE223, which defined the rights of co-tenants or persons owning successive
interests in property to insure their rights, interests, and
claims, and defining further the rights which one may have
in the policy or policies of another, in this manner:
Each can insure his own interest, but in the absence
of any stipulation or agreement n e i t h ,e r has ai1y
claim upon the proceeds of the other's policy.
The Virginia case of Thompson vs. Gearhart, 137 Va.
427, 119 SE2d 67, states:

* * * Each of them had an insurable interest in the
property but a policy in the name of one could not
cov.er the interest of the other. Th e natur,e and
effect of an insurance contract is to indemnify the
insur.ed against loss or damage, and not some one
else who is not a party to the contract; nor has such
other party any lawful claim upon the amount rea~
ized by the insured under the contract; it is the ulllversally accepted doctrine that a contract of insu~·
anc.e is a personal contract and inures to the benefit
12

of the party with whom it is made, and indemnif:es
h·im against loss, and that the amount paid by the
C'Oril'pany "is in no proper or just sense the proceeds
of the policy".
As expressed in Couch on Insurance, Sec. 24.13, Second
Edition, Anderson 1960:
A person has an insurable inter.est in p r o p er t y
whenever he would profit by or gain some advantage by its continued existence and suffer some loss
or disadvantage by its destruction. If he would sustain such loss, it is immaterial whether he has, or
has not, any title in, or lien upon, or possession of,
the property itself.
* * * Any interest in property, legal or .equitable,
qualified, conditional, contingent, or absolute, or
merely the right to use the property, with or without the payment of rent, is suffident.

The law does not seek to evaluate the extent of the
insurable interest. It therefor.e is immaterial that
the i·nterest of the insured is over-valued as long as
the actual interest is substantial in relation to the
amount of the insurance.
A body of law closely paralleling, if not embracing,
these facts may be found in those cases where a life-tenant
in possession of the premises insured for the whole value of
the fee and remaindermen ask for a division among claimants to the successiv.e estates. These efforts to apportion
the insurance proceeds are universally denied. (Annotation:
126 ALR pag.e 336).
Appellants concede that Paul was at least a life-tenant
(Pag.e 15 of their brief). The Respondent does not claim
any mor.e. In fact, since the evidence was submitted in the
case, Appellants have sold the land and the salvage of the
improvements.
13

POINT III
THE "EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS" ALL
RUN IN FAVOR OF THE HUSBAND'S HEIRS
AND ESTATE
Undoubtedly both LHa and Paul at some time prior to
Lila's will intended that the latter should be entitled at least
to retain possession of the pr.emises during his lifetime and,
if Lila predeceased him, to inherit the home from her. Lila,
by her Last Will and Testament (Exhibit 9, paragraph 6),
implemented yet frustrated this apparent agreement. In
any event she left Paul a life estate in the home, the value
of which the law will not seek to establish (See Point IIB
hereinabove) .
If any trust were breached it was by Lila's unilateral
act of disinheriting Paul's (and his first wif.e, Adelia's)
children by limiting his interest to a life estate and by further making that defeasible by a condition subsequent of
any marriage he might contract after Lila's death.

The Russell case, which articulates Respondents's case
more persuasively than we are capable, discussed "equitable considerations" which may entitle a strang.er to the insurance contract to participate in the proceeds.
First of all, the ratio decidendi establishes that neither
marriag.e nor co-ownership is a compelling influence to
avoid the general rule. Nor is the fact that a husband is a
"tenant at sufferance" of the wife's legal property interests.
But this case, in reasoning which the Supr,eme Court
felt strengthened the decision of the i n f e r i o r appellate
court, distinguished an older California ruling with thes·e
observations: (374 P2d at 832).
It may further be noted that in Estate of MacDonald
the decedent had by her will demonstrated an int~nt
that her legatee s h o u l d receive the automobile,
whereas in the present case decedent Mr. Mouser by
purchasing with his separate funds fire insurance
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payable to himself alone evidenced an intent to protect only his own interest in the property and not

that his co-tenant should share in any proceeds of
the insurance contract to which she was not a party
and for which she gave no consideration.

Paul and the mother of his heirs had bought and paid
for [and a portion of the insurance prceeds have already
been devoted to pay the balance remaining due on the mortgage (R. 10-13) affecting] a home which, w h ,en Adelia
died, was worth at least $17,000.00 (R. 107).
Paul's good faith and trust evidenced in his conveying
to his second wife should not now be interpreted to mean
that Paul's heirs benefit by a windfall in their settlement
under a fire policy purchased before his second marriage.
Lila's estate is substantial and Paul's is valueless without the proceeds (R. 103).
Although Adelia intended to leave the home to her
children if they survived their father (Exhibit 24 and R.
108, 109), Paul's subsequent marriage prompted the recording- of a deed to himself (R. 65 and Exhibit 1).
Ther,e is no showing of any consideration for the subsequent deed to Lila (Exhibit 1) nor her contribution to the
insurance premiums.
Can Lila's act in disinheriting Paul and his children
create an "equitable consideration" compelling payment of
the insurance proceeds to Lila's heirs because by Lila's act
she may have legally (but .E.£!_ equitably) defeated his entitlement to inherit the home from her or at the minimum
enjoy a life estate insurable under all the for.egoing rules?
We respectfully submit not, and urge that the Judgment should be affirmed.
R,espectfully submitted,
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN
By Ken Chamberlain
Attorneys for Respondent
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